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Current psychological research on contemporary medicine, and in particular genetics,
often targets the underpinnings of patients’ attitudes and behaviors with respect to
biomedical knowledge and healthcare practices. But few studies approach these
underpinnings as manifestations of the unconscious, while so doing could (in
particular) help understand patients’ apparent difficulties to understand information,
and to subsequently act accordingly (e.g., in making therapeutic decisions, etc.). We
hypothesize that Lacan’s (1966) remarks (“The place of psychoanalysis in medicine”) on
the transferential nature of the demand addressed by the patient (or his family) to the
doctor can help account for these issues: demand filters medical information received
from the practitioner, and thereby motivates subsequent decisions. In this paper, we try
and shed light on this thesis, and focus on pediatric genetics. We start by describing
the manifest doctor-patient-family relationship in the pediatric genetics consultation, in
order to show where unconscious determinants can come to play a role (1). We then
explain Lacan’s theory of demand: what the patient unknowingly demands is knowledge
(savoir), the object of which is the body of jouissance – the libidinal experience of
one’s body through the first libidinal exchanges with the Other of early infancy, whereby
the subject is assigned by the Other (subjectification) a specific fantasmatic status
organizing his desire. Patients’ understanding and attitudes thus vary so greatly because
of this pre-existing filter. Healing and cure are merely apparent objects of the medical
demand, which is an invocative drive seeking knowledge on the cause of one’s desire:
medical demand is an instance of transference. Doctors should thus enable patient
subjectivization, i.e., help them realize that their demand’s genuine object lies in their pre-
existing subjective coordinates (2). In pediatric genetics, apparently paradoxical family
attitudes heavily draw on what G. Raimbault, drawing on Lacan, called implicit demand,
the object of which is knowledge about the family fantasy giving shape to the guilt
of possibly transmitting the disease. We give a clinical example, then show how the
concept of demand helped us elaborate the core of a research project on the subjective
effects of a genetic deafblindness handicap (3).
Keywords: genetics, pediatrics, demand, subjectivization, medical knowledge, transference, desire, doctor-
patient relationship
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INTRODUCTION
One of the main axes of contemporary psychological research
on healthcare and biomedicine revolves around the impact
of personalized medicine. This is especially true with respect
to medical genetics and genomics, which are undergoing an
exponential development. This development gives rise to new
problems, such as the use of unsolicited or secondary findings,
supplemental information unrelated to the patient’s initial
request, and yet of potentially crucial medical importance (such
as BRCA 1 or 2 – see, e.g., Christenhusz et al., 2013).
In the 2000s, psychotherapists and family therapists were
already aware of the need to reflect upon the consequences of this
emerging state of affairs:
“When we go for a routine physical, rather than making blanket
pronouncements about increasing exercise, lowering cholesterol,
and other preventive health measures, our physicians and nurse
practitioners are likely to draw individualized blueprints of
personal risk factors based on our specific personal genotype”
(McDaniel, 2005, p. 27).
The question raised by this state of affairs is: what are
the personal, family and social effects of the possibility to
receive individualized medical recommendations based on
an unprecedented knowledge of one’s genetic and genomic
characteristics?
To answer this question, social science research has explored at
length the personal and family effects of contemporary medicine
(cf. e.g., James et al., 2006; Hens et al., 2016), including the
indirect constraints embedded in genetic healthcare pathways
(e.g., Vailly, 2013). Within psychology, this question has been
scrutinized by cognitive-behavioral psychology (e.g., McDaniel,
2005) or systemic approaches, but few studies have addressed it
through the lens of psychoanalysis, with the exception of e.g.,
Feissel-Lebovici (2001), Aubert-Godard (2005), Driben (2011),
Gargiulo et al. (2017). Yet, the originality of psychoanalysis
lies in that it can spell out the unconscious determinants at
play in the reception of medical information (see e.g. Balint,
1957; Debray, 1996; Gutton and Raimbault, 1975; Raimbault,
1975; Sausse, 1997), of which genetic information is a subset.
The specificity of a psychoanalytic approach to this question
lies in its grasp of how apparently remote autobiographical
elements and repressed childhood situations influence the very
thought processes of information understanding, by structuring
the individual’s personality up to the very way in which she
asks for help and assistance – and what she thereby genuinely
expects.
Therefore, psychoanalysis can shed an original light on
two pressing issues which, albeit encountered daily in clinical
practice, are rarely dealt with directly in research papers,
especially outside of French-speaking psychoanalytic literature:
(1) the unconscious determinants of patients’ difficulties to
understand genetic information; and
(2) the unconscious determinants of subsequent attitudes
or behavior disregarding (or even contradicting)
recommendations based on this information – e.g., in
taking therapeutic decisions, from short-term life-or-death
transplant to long-term therapeutic compliance.
While biomedical and genetic knowledge have developed
exponentially since Lacan’s (1966) lecture at the Salpêtrière
Hospital (entitled “The Place of Psychoanalysis in Medicine”), we
believe that the theory of the demand in the medical field laid
out in this lecture can be of help in spelling out the unconscious
determinant(s) at play in the reception of genetic information.
Some of the literature partly addresses such unconscious
determinants upon the reception of medical information in a
Lacanian fashion, e.g., in the French-speaking psychoanalytic
tradition (Del Volgo, 1997; Brun, 2005 gathers important
collective proceedings on this topic; Lebrun, 2017; Weber, 2017).
But we would like to approach them from an angle which, to
our knowledge, hasn’t been explored as such – especially in
genetics – that of the concept of demand1 (We leave aside non-
Lacanian approaches of demand in medicine; integrating them
would require a systematic review).
Thus, our goal will be to provide a presentation of the Lacanian
approach of demand, and to explore how it can be drawn upon
to understand the clinical stakes of pediatric genetics. As we
shall see, the interest of this specialty is that the unconscious
dynamics (aimed at by the notion of demand) implicitly at work
in the background of what is explicitly asked of the medical
practitioner, come more readily to the forefront: it is generally
parents who come for their child’s disease – this leads them
to express how they unconsciously represent their child. This
family context thus helps shed a strong light on the weight of the
unconscious fantasies at work in parental demand, which bear on
the psychical appropriation of the information and subsequent
decision-making.
In fact, the present paper presents a research trajectory, from
the experience of partaking in pediatric genetics consultations
within a renowned clinical genetics unit (Imagine Institute,
located at Necker Hospital in Paris), to the elaboration of a
funded research project on the psychosocial determinants of
the impact of genetic deafblindness (DéPsySurdi, see section
“Subjectivizing the Demand in Pediatric Genetics: Clinical
Practice and Research Perspectives”). The methodological
constitution of this project is the result of the present work on
demand, which represents its preliminary stage in many respects.
We first provide a description of the manifest doctor-patient
relationship in the pediatric genetics consultation, in order to
point where unconscious determinants can come to play a
role. We then develop Lacan’s understanding of the demand in
medicine – that is, in the patient–doctor relationship. We then
apply this understanding to pediatric genetics, by focusing on
what Raimbault, a pupil of Lacan’s, called “implicit demand”; and
we show how it this concept formed the starting point of the
aforementioned research project.
1While we stuck to the usual English translation, the meaning of the French
“demande” differs from that of the English “demand,” as will appear below in more
detail. While the English “demand” implies a positive requirement, and frequently
a dimension of command, the French “demande” (especially in its psychoanalytic
understanding) mostly refers to the expression of helplessness – so much so that it
often means to beg or to implore.
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Our central idea is that Lacan’s understanding of the demand,
the genuine object of which isn’t medical information and/or
healing but knowledge of one’s fantasies about what takes place in
one’s body, allows for what we propose to call subjectivization –
that is, an awareness that the core object of one’s demand lies
elsewhere than in healing or care. Subjectivization accounts
for the apparent discrepancy between the information explicitly
received to the patient and his family, and their understanding
and subsequent actions.
It is by taking into account this unconscious search for another
knowledge at work in the patient’s demand that the medical
practitioner will be in a position to both enable moments of
subjectivization, and deliver an adjusted medical response (both
in tone and in content) without being unknowingly caught in the
patient’s implicit demand.
THE MANIFEST
DOCTOR-PATIENT-FAMILY
RELATIONSHIP IN THE PEDIATRIC
GENETICS CONSULTATION
This description of the pediatric genetics consultation derives
from OP and RP’s participation to routine clinical consultations
in the pediatric genetics unit of Necker-Enfants Malades Hospital
(Paris), and subsequent exchanges with medical practitioners in
the context of these consultations. In other words, material in this
section is not derived from research projects or investigations, but
from routine practice.
In France, Necker Hospital has always been at the
forefront of an interdisciplinary dialog between medicine
and psychoanalysis – both in medical genetics and in child
psychiatry. At the time when Lacan examined “The Place
of Psychoanalysis in Medicine” (1966), one of his early
followers, Ginette Raimbault (M.D., Ph.D., psychoanalyst, who
introduced Balint groups in France along with her husband
Emile Raimbault) was head of an INSERM (French National
Institute for Mental Health) unit working on hereditary
child metabolic diseases. Since then, the interaction between
psychoanalysis and pediatric genetics at Necker has been
constant: many consultations are carried, on an ordinary basis,
by a pediatrician-geneticist and a psychoanalyst, who contributes
to the consultation as he sees fit (and can, if needed, meet with
patients afterward).
Classical medical genetics is mostly concerned with
Mendelian inheritance of pathogenic variants (along with
random spontaneous mutations, called de novo); as such,
it mostly focuses on monogenic diseases – accounted
for by the variation of a single gene – or, at broadest,
on a defined set of genes. Pediatric genetics is thus the
best setting for psychoanalytic work on the personal
impact of genetics: since it revolves around Mendelian
transmission, its effects can be best witnessed in clinical
contexts where families come to the Medical Genetics Unit
to sort out both the name and the cause of their child’s
disease.
This is typically a three-step process: first a clinical
examination (comprising the proposition to undergo genetic
sequencing and, in case of acceptance, the signature of an
informed consent form), followed by sequencing (genetic
analysis, on the basis of questions raised by the clinical
examination), and then – a couple weeks later – by the
announcement of the diagnosis (or lack thereof), along with
therapeutic advice (if possible).
A specific trait of pediatric genetics is that clinical examination
involves questions regarding potential antecedents in family
history: the geneticist, in addition to undertaking a clinical
examination of the child and questioning his parents, searches
for signs of the disease in previous generations and relatives
while drawing a family tree. This entails that the explicit
parental demand to the practitioner directly puts parents
themselves in a position to receive confirmation that they
have transmitted the disease – if the genetic character of the
disease hasn’t been established already. This context cannot
but trigger family guilt: whatever the results of the analysis,
the anxiety to have passed on the disease is in everyone’s
minds – to the point, not infrequently, of inducing momentary
psychical splittings, as when parents, e.g., leave out of the family
tree a deceased relative who happened to have signs of the
disease.
After sequencing (biological analysis), another consultation
is planned for the announcement of the diagnosis. It is often
extremely emotional, due to the guilt-laden anticipation –
conscious or not – of having in fact transmitted the disease:
learning that the child indeed has a genetic disease would be
synonymous with having passed it on to him, news which can
sometimes trigger deferred psychotic or psychotic-like onsets –
be they momentary or revealing a personality structure –
if parents are fragile. (In de novo cases, where the child
is the first to have the disease because of a spontaneous
mutation in the parents’ sexual cells, we often witness guilt
as well, but in a reversed form, so to speak: parents feel
guilty because their child is the only one affected with the
disease.)
A striking feature of such consultations is that, after the
practitioner has taken the time to announce the diagnosis,
and then given information about the transmission of the
disease (dominant vs. recessive, etc.) and the therapeutic and
lifecourse implications for the child, parents often have great
trouble making sense of the medical information they have
received – be it immediately or, more frequently, shortly
afterward. Often do the geneticists find themselves in a position
to have to explain again the mode of transmission and its
implications, up to a point where it clearly appears that the
real question isn’t “what is the disease and how has it been
transmitted?,” but “Why us ?” – in other terms, an attempt
to make sense of blind biological fatality. The geneticist is the
bearer of bad news, his speech is very often received as an
oracle-like prediction (Feissel-Lebovici, 2001; Munnich, 2014);
yet, even when he has successfully isolated the pathogenic
variant, parents are often perplexed and cannot make sense
of these traumatic news. This is often evidenced in their
spontaneous question about what can now be done to cure their
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child – while it has just been made perfectly clear to them
that only symptom-oriented care (at best) could hereafter be
implemented.
Geneticists experience the same type of perplexity during
follow-up consultations about medical decisions and care: often
do they see that the previously communicated (and repeated)
information concerning the stakes of proper therapeutic
decisions doesn’t seem to lead the parents to what would, from
the outside, appear as the most reasonable decision – such as
transplant, choice of medically adequate treatment, etc.
For example, in pediatric immunogenetics, it is not rare to
see parents refusing life-saving bone-marrow transplants for their
children, because of the residual 10% risk of lethal outcome –
while, by refusing, they could be seen as in fact becoming
responsible for their children’s future death, bound to happen if
the immune system keeps deteriorating for genetic reasons.
How can a Lacanian approach to the patient–doctor
relationship taking place in pediatric genetics account for this
often paradoxical gap between the objective, medical information
transmitted to parents and patients, and its subjective reception
and elaboration? We first need to lay out Lacan’s understanding
of the demand in contemporary medical consultations (2). We
will then use these elements to explore how they come to play in
pediatric genetics (3).
THE MEANING OF THE DEMAND IN THE
CONTEMPORARY MEDICAL
CONSULTATION
A Demand for Knowledge About
Jouissance of the Body
In his remarks on “The Place of Psychoanalysis in Medicine”
(Lacan, 1966), Lacan writes that psychoanalysis can help medical
practice – and is, in this perspective, part of it – since it can spell
out what is at stake in the “authentically medical position” (Lacan,
1966, p. 301): namely, the mode of response to what the patient
unconsciously expects from the doctor, through what Lacan calls
“the demand” (id., p. 302).
Paradoxical as it sounds, the patient’s doesn’t primarily expect
healing, which can be provided by therapeutic devices and agents
(surgery, drug, etc.). Aside from healing, “a certain something
remains constant, and every doctor knows what it is”: demand.
And “the significance of the [patient’s] demand, wherein the
medical function authentically comes to play” (id., p. 302), is
that it is a “demand of knowledge.” That is, the demand to the
medical practitioner is an instance of what psychoanalysis calls
transference (Lacan, 1966, p. 308), whereby the subject supposes
a knowledge in the addressee of his demand, thereby considered
as a “subject supposed to know” (Lacan, 1973, Chap. 18; various
texts in Brun, 2005 refer to this point).
The object of this type of knowledge is not the body
defined as what can be “photographed, X-rayed, calibrated,
diagrammatized” and so on (Lacan, 1966, p. 303), by the medical
devices which help establish the diagnosis and heal. In other
terms, the body is not to be understood, in the footsteps of the
“Cartesian dichotomy between thought and extension” (id.), as a
highly complex machine, in spite of the exponential development
of exploration and imaging devices which present a purified
version of it (cf. e.g., Potier, 2009). One should be aware that
this exponential development fostered an “epistemo-somatic rift”
(Lacan, 1966, p. 303) encouraging to (mis)understand the body
(soma, in greek) upon which medical knowledge (episteme)
should focus – and to miss that it is not to be understood as a
complex machine, but as a nexus of “jouissance” (id.). This rift is
typical of contemporary medicine: the diversity and complexity
of healing devices, machines and substances developed on the
basis of biomedical scientific progress tends to overshadow the
specific function of the practitioner, whose very authority and
personal prestige were deemed throughout the ages to be a central
part of his function (Lacan, 1966, p. 297).
What the patient demands from the doctor as subject
supposed to know is a knowledge about the jouissance taking
place in his body. “The rapport thanks to which the doctor is
what he is, is the patient’s demand. Inside this strong relationship
where so many things take place, this dimension is fully revealed
in its original meaning (. . .): the relation to the body’s jouissance”
(Lacan, 1966, p. 309).
We thus need to briefly account for the constitution of the
subject’s relationship to the body’s jouissance, in order to shed
light on the patient’s demand to the doctor.
The Subjectification of Jouissance:
Drive, Demand, and Desire
In this context, jouissance refers to the untamed, not-yet-
organized circulation of excitation which takes place in the
infant’s body during the primordial interactions with his human
environment, whereby the infant experiences his body as such
(Lacan, 2016, Chap. 13). It is a pure erotic experience of one’s
organic being, in all its intensity – a jouissance of being (cf.
also Dimitriadis, 2017) [It should be noted that while this
jouissance involves direct interactions with the Other as real,
since it corresponds to a “mythical” (Lacan, 2016, Chap. 13)
moment prior to the linguistic constitution of the subject qua
separated – more on this just below, the Other is correspondingly
not experienced as separated, but as part of a field of jouissance
comprising himself and the infant].
At this mythical (i.e., reconstructed) stage of the constitution
of the subject, in the infant’s state of absolute dependence upon
its environment (Freud’s Hilfslosigkeit), it is the Other’s response
to the bodily manifestations of anxiety to which jouissance gives
rise which retroactively converts these manifestations into an
appeal. This is the first step of the process of subjectification
(subjectivation, Lacan, 2016, Chap. 12): the infant’s alienation to
the Other’s response.
The paradigm case is the infant’s cry (cf. Lacan, 2016, Chap.
24): it is the “marks of [the Other’s] response that had the power
to turn his cry into a call” (Lacan, 2006, Remarks on Daniel
Lagache’s Presentation). While the infant’s cry doesn’t initially
express a specific need (since he wouldn’t know what he needs),
but instead manifests an unbearable excitation and is thus at the
level of jouissance, the Other (typically, the caregiver) interprets
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it as a call for a specific action on his side – which will, in turn,
be determined by how He unconsciously represents the infant.
This representation is constituted by signifiers, discrete elements
of speech considered as distinct sounds, independently of their
usual socially determined meaning; the specific signifiers which
constitute the Other’s representation of the infant will form the
latter’s ego-ideal, the very core of his subjectivity.
These marks, in which the all-powerfulness of the response
are inscribed, are thus circled in reality with the signifier’s
line. It is not without reason that these realities are
called “insignias.” The term is nominative here. It is the
constellation of these insignias that constitutes the subject’s
ego-ideal (Lacan, 2006, Remarks on Daniel Lagache’s
Presentation).
That is to say, the function of the Other’s response is to enable
a primary identification to bind the infant’s jouissance through
signifiers which represent him for the Other. Herein lies the “all-
powerfulness of the response.”
The function of the Other’s initial response is thus to turn the
bodily jouissance of the cry into what Lacan calls an “invocative
drive” addressed to the Other (Lacan, 1973): by understanding
the cry as a call, the Other leads the infant to experience what
takes place in his body as a drive (with its source in a specific
erogenous zone, the mouth), aimed at satisfaction and expressed
as a demand. The cry thus becomes “the radical knot where
demand and drive come to be bound” (Lacan, 1973, session of
May 27th, 1964 – modified translation).
At this level of primordial alienation, where the infant qua
subject of jouissance is bound to grasp what happens in his body
through the response of the Other, he undergoes an identification
to what Lacan calls object a (objet petit a) of the Other, wherein
he comes to wonder “what the Other wants from him” (Lacan,
2016) in so responding to his cry.
Therefore, he needs the Other to elucidate the signifiers of
primary identification (often written S1 by Lacan) by drawing
on a constellation of complementary signifiers (written S2) that
account for the Other’s choice of S1. Typically, S2 stands for the
Oedipal narrative which accounts for the unconscious choice of
S1 by the Other – most often the mother. [In most cases, the
maternal or mothering Other will be in a position to provide such
a constellation by drawing on the Name-of-the-Father, Lacan’s
formal re-writing of the Oedipal complex (Lacan, 1998); for a
more detailed recent presentation, cf. e.g., Razon et al., 2017, see
section “The Manifest Doctor-Patient-Family Relationship in the
Pediatric Genetics Consultation.”) In such a second step, whereby
the primordial Other is divided by the necessity to account for his
choice (most often by leaving room in the S2 for another figure
co-defining the infant’s identity through a paternal function, such
as the father), the object a to which the infant was identified
acquires a new meaning through S2 – and the infant can thus
know what he is for this Other, i.e., what the Other wants from
him (Lacan, 1973, 2016). From the perspective of the Other,
the infant becomes an object of desire since he is viewed as a
representative of another desired figure; he becomes, as Lacan
puts it, “phallicized” (Lacan, 1973). From the perspective of the
infant, the maternal Other thus appears as desiring, since she
also cathects someone else, who partly accounts for what the
infant represents for her. Lacan calls this second step “separation”
(Lacan, 1973).
Thus, at the end of this reconstructed two-step process of
unconscious subjectification by alienation/separation, the cry has
become a demand qua invocative drive. Correspondingly, its
object, i.e., what could genuinely satisfy it, isn’t merely the oral
partial object (breasts, etc.). Since the maternal Other, when
giving the breast to a crying infant, draws on the signifier-based
framework of Her representation of the infant qua object a of
desire, it is Her repressed representation of the infant qua object
a, which constitutes him as subject of the unconscious, which is the
object of his demand.
Thus, once the subject is constituted, everything that he comes
to voice will, from the perspective of the unconscious, have to be
understood as a demand, unknowingly articulating the signifiers
which constitute the coordinates of the particular object a that he
is for the Other.
Consequences on the Patient–Doctor
Relationship: Subjectivizing the Demand
It is for this reason that Lacan starts his conference on “The Place
of Psychoanalysis in Medicine” by stressing the “gap between
demand and desire” (Lacan, 1966, p. 302): while the manifest
demand addressed to the practitioner looks like a demand for
healing, the repressed signifiers of the desire of the Other to which
the demand can be related show the discrepancy between what he
demands and what he genuinely desires.
When he is sent to the doctor, or comes to meet him, the
patient does not simply expects to be healed. He puts the
doctor to test, to see whether he can bring him out of
his condition; this is altogether different from healing the
patient, since this demand can imply that the latter very
much wants to remain ill. Sometimes the patient wants us
to authenticate his status of illness; in many other cases, his
obvious wish is that we help him remain ill, treat him in the
way he wants, which will help him remain settled within his
illness. I just need recall a recent experience: a patient, who
recently came in a formidable state of permanent anxious
depression having lasted for more than 20 years, was in utter
terror at the idea that I could do something for him.
(. . .) As soon as we’ve pointed out [the gap between demand
and desire], it appears that it isn’t necessary to be a psychoanalyst,
nor even a doctor, to know that once anyone, be they our best
friend, male or female, demands something, it is in no way
identical to – and, sometimes, in full opposition with – what they
desire (Lacan, 1966, p. 302).
What the patient desires can thus, depending on the
structure of the signifiers which constitute him as subject of
the unconscious, amount to various types of relationship with
the Other – such as, e.g., remain dependent from Him (“help
him remain ill”) – which are then projected onto the person
of the medical practitioner. These types of relationship with
the Other refer to the type of object a to which the subject is
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reduced by the desire of the Other – this is the formula of the
fundamental fantasy (Lacan, 1973), which formalizes the role and
the organ (mouth, etc.) to which the subject identified at the step
of separation from the Other. It is this formula, to which the
subject identified in separation, which gives its shape to the desire
of the Other, and that the subject unknowingly seeks to uncover
by voicing his demand, which is at bottom transference, i.e., a
“demand of knowledge” (Lacan, 1966, p. 308).
Hence the importance of the medical response: strictly
understanding what the patient says as a demand for healing via
a cure, and thereby missing that the signifiers used or hinted at by
the patient are indirectly referring to something else (the object
a) will prevent the doctor from grasping that what he wishes is to
know the truth about the structure given to his jouissance by the
desire of the Other, i.e., about the fantasy at play.
Correspondingly, it is by taking into account this unconscious
search for another knowledge at work in the patient’s demand
that the medical practitioner will be in a position to deliver
an adjusted medical response (both in tone and in content).
In the medical consultation, especially in the context of heavy
medical examinations, leaving out this dimension will typically
lead the patient to persist in fulfilling his unconscious role in
the fantasy (e.g., request more and more examinations, or act
in opposition with what he is told). Reversely, the medical
consultation (as Del Volgo, 1997 has insisted) provides the
practitioner with a context propitious to help the patient gain
awareness, and question the consistency, of the knowledge of
his jouissance that he supposes that the Other holds – in a
movement analogous to the end of a psychoanalytic cure, where
transference is dissolved, i.e., the consistency of the subject
supposed to know collapses (Lacan, 1968(unpublished), Session
of January 10th, 1968). “On the one hand, [the doctor] deals
with an energetic cathexis, the potency of which he cannot
suspect if he isn’t told about it” – i.e., transference – and
“on the other, he needs to put this cathexis between brackets
precisely because of the power that he possesses, that he needs to
distribute [i.e., medicine, OP], and of the scientific plane within
which he is situated” (Lacan, 1966, p. 308). In so doing, he
puts his medical knowledge between brackets in order to gain
access to the patient’s representation of his knowledge about
jouissance, in order to be able to provide the right, adjusted medical
response.
This analysis of the medical function thus implies that it
depends on the doctor to hear the patient’s demand as the
manifestation of a desire to know something about his jouissance:
he can thereby help the patient become aware of his desire,
instead of responding to the demand solely by drawing on the
position granted to him by his knowledge and position. This is
certainly not to say that the medical practitioner has to explicitly
interpret the patient’s discourse: a medical consultation isn’t a
preliminary interview prior to the initiation of a psychoanalytic
cure. But being aware that the demand’s object is knowledge upon
the patient’s jouissance can help make the latter aware that the
truth of his demand (in the psychoanalytic sense of the term:
the subjective truth) doesn’t primarily lie in medical knowledge –
once again, a preliminary step to an adjusted medical response in
terms of cure and healing.
We propose to call the awareness that the medical practitioner
can help the patient experience a subjectivization of the latter’s
demand. Subjectification, the word aptly chosen by A. Price to
translate the French word “subjectivation” (Lacan, 2016, Chap.
12), refers to the constitution of the subject through alienation
to, and separation from, the Other; we view subjectivization as
referring to something different, namely the process of becoming
aware of the essentially subjective nature of the demand to the
practitioner concerning what happens in his body. Subjectivizing
means understanding, to some extent, that the meaning of
this demand derives from elements of one’s own subjective
coordinates; in Lacanian terms, this amounts to understanding
that the signifiers of one’s demand have to be referred to the
primary signifiers in the Other, which assign the subject to a
certain position qua object a of the desire of the Other. A medical
consultation carried by a practitioner aware of both medical
stakes and the subjective meaning of demand, can help the patient
partially grasp this subjective meaning, and question what it is he
wants from the practitioner.
Focused on producing in the subject an interrogation on the
genuine meaning of his demand (and open up the way for a
potential further inquiry on this desire itself), subjectivization in
a medical context is a the condition for adjusted medical action,
and a potential preliminary step with respect to a potential deeper
elucidation – such as the one carried in a psychoanalytic cure,
which ultimately aims at helping the subject move beyond his
assignation as object a of the Other’s desire.
An Instance of a Setting Enabling
Subjectivization: The Instant to Say
We can illustrate this concept by commenting an example
through which Del Volgo presents the original clinical setting
that she calls the “instant to say” (1997, p. 61), which we view
as a typical setting enabling subjectivization. Del Volgo, both a
hospital medical practitioner and a Lacanian psychoanalyst, gives
examples of how, within the context of a medical consultation,
she asks patients about their medical history in such a way as
to enable an “instant to say.” This refers to a logical moment
when patients, by recalling the important events of their life in
the course of recounting the history of their illness and its various
stages or occurrences, are presented with the opportunity to grasp
the signifiers with which they describe the illness in relation to
important prior life events. While this opportunity isn’t presented
explicitly, or as a goal of the consultation, this associative process
opens up a space aside the healing-oriented dimension of the
medical response, and gives them a chance to grasp and question
the meaning of their medical demand – that is, the structure given
to their jouissance by prior important life events. In so doing, she
doesn’t respond do the immediate demand but tries to help the
patient gradually become aware of the subjective significance of
his symptoms, i.e., of the fantasy which underlies them.
We will comment on a case that she presents in Del Volgo
(1997). An elderly asthmatic patient, Ange, experienced a severe
asthma crisis upon learning from the specialist that his wife,
after 3 weeks of nocturnal hallucinations which made him feel
“lost” much like an orphan, was in fact not suffering from
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a brain tumor, as initially suspected. Being asked to recall
important elements in his life, he indicates that he has been
repeatedly and unexpectedly been put in the position to be the
closest to his mother: his father died in the beginning of World
War II, when his older brothers had already left the house.
He experienced this as becoming the man in the house – an
important signifier for his personal history. His first respiratory
crisis occurred at age 30, “the age of adulthood” (where he could
go see a doctor, unlike childhood where he was once beat up for
doing so): he accidentally started spitting blood during physical
effort, which (he says) includes physical intimacy. It thus seems
that respiratory problems became associated with fantasies of
castration as a punishment for Oedipal desire, summoned (in
accordance with Freud’s bi-phasic trauma theory) in the context
of adulthood and conjugal life. It is as if the guilt of desire
(being put in the position of a phallicized object a vis-à-vis the
Other in the fantasy) could find a somatic expression – castration
symbolized as bleeding out during effort; and that, conversely,
the presence of the Other was experienced as the approach of
a forbidden oral object a, thus causing in his body a symbolic
equivalent of castration through hysterical conversion.
This interpretation was confirmed through transference
during the next consultation, when he mentioned that a cardiac
accident occurred while he was eating sweets on the anniversary
day of their first consultation: the reminiscence of the first
consultation during the second one, and the structure of the
Oedipal fantasy within which he is caught up, accounts for
the symbolic equivalence between the forbidden pleasure of
eating sweets and becoming intimately close with the mother of
childhood. The cardiac accident is thus a transferential replica
of his first respiratory problems at age 30, confirming that these
series of bodily events can be understood against the background
of the way in which his jouissance is structured – namely,
through an oral Oedipal fantasy. Those elements constitute the
background on which the patient’s associations, supported by
Del Volgo’s psychoanalytic listening, shed a partial light during
this sequence; it was then up to the patient to subjectivize the
connection between these past events and the actual occurrences
of respiratory problems.
We now draw on this conceptualization of the demand as
carrying a repressed desire open to subjectivization (and open to
further elucidation), and we turn to pediatric genetics.
SUBJECTIVIZING THE DEMAND IN
PEDIATRIC GENETICS: CLINICAL
PRACTICE AND RESEARCH
PERSPECTIVES
Explicit vs. Implicit Demand in Clinical
Practice
As mentioned above, pediatric genetics is particularly interesting
to study the demand at work in contemporary medical practice
since the structure of the fantasy which organizes the patient’s
desire (and thereby filters the reception of information) is often
more readily accessible during the consultation. The reason for
this is that the demand for diagnosis and cure is voiced for
the child by the parents – the unconscious of whom largely
contributed to structuring the child’s – who feel responsible for
his disease since it is viewed as hereditary (at least potentially: the
cause is sought for in previous generations).
As we mentioned above, the main proponent of applying
Lacan’s theory of the medical demand to pediatric genetics was
Ginette Raimbault, in charge of research on the unconscious
stakes of medical consultation at INSERM (French National
Institute for Mental Health), and whose clinical field was a
pediatrics unit working on hereditary child metabolic diseases –
the precise hereditary cause of which was largely unknown
at the time, for lack of adequate sequencing apparatus and
knowledge. In 1966, right after Lacan gave his lecture on
“The place of Psychoanalysis in Medicine,” she gave a didactic
presentation of her research – which consisted in assisting silently
to consultations and elaborating on the unconscious dynamics
at stake in the family’s demand. This is how she describes these
dynamics:
“As early as during the first interview with the medical
practitioner, the parents formulate the results of their own
research about the etiology of the disease, considered as a trouble.
(. . .) The parents’ formulation shifts from ‘this makes no sense’
to ‘this is the sense we give to this disease”’ (Raimbault in Lacan,
1966, p. 313).
While the subjective sense given by the family to the
disease partly depends on the medical antecedents, the lack of
information or the powerlessness of medical science (op. cit.), it
largely derives from “the elaboration of fantasies concerning the
agent of the disease” (Raimbault in Lacan, 1966, p. 313).
“the child’s disease thus seems to reveal the family’s problem and
its singular drama, which is actualized in the disease and feeds off
of it, but isn’t properly speaking caused by it. The difficulties faced
by doctors partly stem from the fact that they only hear the explicit
demand (‘Cure this crisis!’) and not the implicit one (‘This is our
drama’)” (Raimbault in Lacan, 1966, p. 313).
Any medical discourse concerning this hereditary agent will
thus be filtered by a pre-existing family fantasy organizing what
she calls implicit demand to the practitioner.
The specificity of the notion of implicit demand is that it
refers to the parents’ quest for help with respect to a guilt
which, albeit coming to the forefront at the occasion of the
child’s disease, predates it. Raimbault’s main clinical finding
is thus that the disease is filtered by the “window of the
fantasy”: to put it in the Lacanian framework which underlies
her work, the disease is experienced by the parents (especially the
mother) as a punishment for their normal anticipated fantasmatic
elaboration of the status of the child qua object a, prior to
any medical condition. Since this anticipated elaboration – way
before the birth of the child – cannot but include an element of
repressed guilt (even in neurotic contexts: a child is always partly
viewed by both parents as an Oedipal child), the subsequent
disease is experienced, through an unconscious displacement, as
punishment for the accomplishment of the Oedipal wish to have
a child with one’s parent.
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The notion of implicit demand thus directly echoes Lacan’s
characterization of transference on the doctor as a demand
for knowledge upon one’s jouissance, and narrows it down to
the context of hereditary diseases: what is implicitly demanded
is knowledge about the family fantasy giving shape to their
guilt. It is in this wake that Raimbault insists that what
matters most, on the side of medical practitioners, is to prevent
stereotyped attitudes and responses based on unquestioned
personal assumptions concerning what stands as appropriate
behavior in those medical situations: they are laden with
the practitioners’ personal subjective organization, and would
prevent him from grasping the family’s implicit demand
(Raimbault in Lacan, 1966, p. 314).
The core of the knowledge that he is unconsciously asked by
the family – the object a of the family’s demand, so to speak (and it
most often is the mother’s, in these circumstances) – concerns the
particular structure of the desire of having a child, of which they
(unavoidably) feel guilty. Responding to their implicit demand
would amount to help them subjectivize this family fantasy.
An Example of Implicit Demand: A
Consultation in Pediatric Genetics
The medical context in which hereditary child diseases nowadays
take place is pediatric genetics, wherein such implicit demand
unfolds. The following example illustrates elements present
within a host of consultations, and comes from OP’s practice
of pediatrician-genetician/psychoanalyst dual consultations in
pediatric genetics. Only de-identified data were used; therefore,
an ethics approval was not required for the use of this material
as per the Institution’s guidelines and national regulations. It
shows how the explicit demand carries an implicit one, which
filters both the reception of information and the subsequent
decision-making of patients.
In this context, that of the pediatrician-genetician and
psychoanalyst, the difference with both Del Volgo’s setting and
Raimbault’s research is that the psychoanalytic perspective is
embodied by a specific person (not the doctor), who also actively
partakes in the consultation, sometimes to an important extent –
when the weight of the implicit demand comes to the forefront.
It is not only listening, but also active interventions, which open
up a space of subjectivization, i.e., of relating the signifiers of
the demand (the explicit demand, in Raimbault’s quote) to those
of the underlying fantasy of the implicit demand of the family
singular drama. This is sometimes needed in order to shed light
on the extent to which this demand filters medical information
and subsequent behavior.
The following example is reduced to a few elements
for anonymity reasons. A young mother of two adolescents
was extremely reluctant to try a bone marrow transplant
which could save them both of a rapidly developing disease
enabled by a hereditary recessive immunodeficiency. Hearing
the unmentioned guilt present in her speech, OP told her
“in any case Madam, you are not responsible for your sons’
disease” – in order to stress that she couldn’t know, medically
speaking, that mothering them would lead to transmitting them
the disease, but that her apparent sorrow might be rooted
somewhere else. She replied (thereby illustrating the equivocation
enabled by the signifier “guilt”): “what do you mean? I am
by no means irresponsible! I’m doing my best here!” Her
mastery of French language was more than sufficient to rule
out a cognitive explanation for her apparent mistake. In so
responding, she showed us how guilty she does feel for their
disease, experienced transitively as a punishment for what (in
the rest of the consultation, in relation to biographical elements)
most likely appeared to be the structurally normal (see section
“The Subjectification of Jouissance: Drive, Demand, and Desire”),
predating Oedipal fantasy of receiving a child from her father –
the paradigm forbidden desire of which, at a certain level,
she unconsciously expected the consultation to relieve her, by
helping her formulate it. The singular drama was thus that she
unconsciously experienced this forbidden desire, upon which
becoming a mother largely relies, as directly punished by the
disease. It is this unconscious connection, qualifying her relation
to her children qua phallic objects a (because of the Oedipal
structure of the Other organizing her unconscious), that she
needed to subjectivize; for ultimately, the way to partly soothe
this guilt is to start by acknowledging it, which is the object of
her implicit demand to medical knowledge about what takes place
within her children’s bodies, and therefore filters how she heard
OP’s intervention.
Unfortunately, this subjectivization (realizing the relation
between her experience of the disease and a guilt of a
different origin) was made extremely difficult by the pressing
therapeutic context, where a decision had to be made in the
near future concerning the bone marrow transplant. In other
words, aside the response which she unconsciously sought
concerning the fantasmatic cause of what was taking place
within their children’s bodies, a healing-oriented response also
had to be given her concerning the stakes and urgency of the
transplant. Upon hearing about the necessity to soon make a
decision concerning this matter, she said she was extremely
reluctant to accept it, because of the residual 10% chance of
lethal outcome (in spite of the certainty of such an outcome
in the absence of transplant). One can wonder whether a
masochistic need to be punished for the Oedipal character of
her fantasy, which enabled her to represent her children as
phallicized objects a in the first place, could account for her
decision: wouldn’t a lethal amount (inexorable in the absence
of transplant) symbolically amount to a paradigm punishment
for her forbidden fantasy? In this case, what appeared to be the
structure of her fantasy could account for her fantasy, with its
masochistic components. Her behavior, seemingly paradoxical
with respect to the perspective of healing and cure, thus appears
in a new light (see section “Consequences on the Patient–Doctor
Relationship: Subjectivizing the Demand”).
Demand-Based Starting Point of a
Qualitative Research: The Subjective
Effects of Genetic Deafblindness
Finally, we would like to give a brief illustration of the demand-
based rationale of an ongoing qualitative research based on
this conception of the demand in pediatric genetics. This
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multidisciplinary research focuses on the subjective effects of
genetic deafblindness on autonomy in child, adolescent and adult
patients with Usher, Wolfram and Stickler syndromes (research
codename: DéPsySurdi). It is funded by the French Rare Disease
Foundation (“Fondation Maladies Rares”); RP is its principal
investigator, and it has been made possible by a close partnership
with the Reference Center for Genetic Deafness (INSERM –
U587, dir. Dr. S. Marlin).
What we briefly present here is the nucleus of the
psychoanalytic rationale of this research, jointly conceived by RP
and OP on the basis of a Lacanian approach to the demand in
the context of genetics (and in particular pediatric genetics). This
nucleus is both the result of a research on medical demand with
a focus on pediatric genetics, and the basis of the specifically
psychoanalytical contribution to the DéPsySurdi project; on this
basis, collaborators in psychology, medicine and social science
joined in order to turn this nucleus into an exploration of the
effects of genetic deafblindness at a psychosocial level. (Our
methodology, which we cannot fully unfold here, relies on semi-
structured interviews using sign language or tactile sign language,
in order to leave as much room as possible for association,
and more generally punctual emergences of formations of the
unconscious.)
The gene-based Usher, Wolfram and Stickler syndromes
gradually affect both hearing and sight up to partial or total
auditory and visual deficits, resulting in deafblindness (a specific
handicap, wherein large parts of audio-visual compensation is
impossible). The effects of this handicap on one’s autonomy
appear to vary greatly; it has important psychiatric comorbidities,
such as depression due to increased social isolation. We decided
to examine the effects of deafblindness on autonomy in child,
adolescent and adult subjects because autonomy is centrally
impacted by this handicap, and is thus the natural manifest
object of family and patient demand: the demand for medical
and social help and support greatly focuses on compensating this
handicap, especially in parents with children and teens affected
with these syndromes. Therefore, various strategies, devices (e.g.,
technological) and personalized supports (personal or family
assistants, etc.) are devoted to this compensation, and thereby
help young patients and their parents achieve social participation
and self-realization: the explicit objects of the families’ demands
are means to ease the burden of the handicap and facilitate
interaction.
This initial context raises specifically psychoanalytic
questions: doesn’t the variety of available supports sometimes
cloud the subjective significance of the syndromes? In other
words, behind the need for help and support, does the current
available medico-social leave room for subjectivization in the
families’ and patients discourse on the handicap? To what
extent can they question the signifiers which, at the manifest
level, they use to refer to the everyday impact of the handicap,
and ways to alleviate its burden? This would mean having the
opportunity to relate the gene-based loss of autonomy (along
with the parental guilt which accompanies it and is reinforced
by genetic sequencing) to what Raimbault called the predating
family fantasy which gives its particular sense to their child’s
handicap. In this respect, a particularly sensitive question is
the degree to which the child’s participation to the family
fantasy – and conversely, his degree of autonomy with respect
to it. What room do they leave for the gap between their child’s
autonomy in the expression of his demand, and their own
representation of him (laden with the guilt of his syndrome,
which clouds the structural predating guilt)? And in cases where
this gap is thin, is his demand devoid of singular desire, i.e.,
just a reflection of his main caregiver’s fantasy, in which he
would be caught up? Or does it present aspects of a singular
desire of separation qua phallicized object a, waiting to be
acknowledged as such? This stake is particularly crucial, since the
context of deafblindness leaves less room for separation, since
communicating often requires to use tactile sign language – and
thus to touch. What of the potential equivocity of the signifier in
these contexts?
These are the questions which led us to decide to focus on this
cluster of syndroms, in order to help doctors position themselves
with respect to the unconscious question concerning one’s body
at play in the demands for support that they receive.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we wanted to draw on Lacan’s take on the demand
to stress that the exponential development of personalized and
stratified medicine, which help provide previously unexpected
adjusted cure and healing, requires medical practitioners to
remain sensitive to the dimension of the demand for knowledge
about jouissance, in order to prevent their response (cure,
investigations, etc.) from reinforcing the underlying repressed
fantasies, with their masochistic basis.
It is even more important when the object of this knowledge
is what takes place in someone else’s body: these situations are
often quite projective, in the sense that it is difficult for caregivers
to acknowledge that their understanding of their child’s bodily
symptoms is heavily influenced by his role in their fantasy. This
is particularly true when the child represents the object of the
Mother’s (and not the couple’s) fantasy, as Lacan wrote in the first
“Note on the child” in 1969 (Lacan, 1986).
The unconscious guilt of having transmitted the disease, even
in cases where transmission cannot be established (which are
numerous, even as of today), contributes to these projections. It is
for this reason what we chose to focus on pediatric genetics, since
this clinical field is both saturated with such projections, but at
the same time open to potentially disalienating interventions –
especially if children themselves, as well as other members
of the family, actively partake in the medical exchanges, so
as to distinguish their own speech to their parent’s implicit
demand.
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